PLACING THE TRAVELLER: 
THE BANAL GEOGRAPHIES OF TRAVELLING DOCUMENTS

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Abstract

Flying at 30,000 feet the modern air traveller can see the undifferentiated world stretching out beneath them, and in doing so bask in the glow of globalization triumphant. Yet located in the seat pocket, jacket, or bag there lurks constant, if banal, reminders of the fiction of this perspective. Nested around the body of the traveller is a mobile archive that aims to embrace the traveller in a network within which the place of the traveller as a traveller is maintained. This paper examines the hidden genealogies and geographical imaginations of these travelling documents. Drawing on examples from the fabrication of New Zealand’s post-World War One passport and permit system the chapter suggests that rather than annihilating place, travel documents entangle the traveller in complex relationships of placeness and placelessness which have long been based on the biopolitical geographies of threat and risk.

Introduction

Marc Augé (1995: 77–8) has famously used the phrase ‘non-places’ to refer to those spaces which could not be positively defined as ‘relational or historical, or concerned with identity’. Drawing on the work of de Certeau, Augé (1995: 78) characterised these spaces as constituting a world ‘surrendered to solitary individuality, to the fleeting, the temporary and the ephemeral’. Such non-places he suggested could be easily quantified by ‘totalling all the air, rail and motorway routes, the mobile cabins called ‘means of transport’ (aircraft, trains and road vehicles), the airports and railway stations, hotel chains, leisure parks, large retail outlets, and finally the complex skein of cable and wireless networks’ (Augé 1995: 79). The enumeration of travel spaces as characteristic ‘non-places’ is not surprising since Augé argues that the very act of moving creates in individuals a particular form of solitude that positions them
outside the flow of time. Consequently, whilst places create ‘the organically social’, non-places, in contrast, ‘create solitary contractuality’ (Augé 1995: 94). An intellectual association with its buttresses of functionality, standardisation, individuality and alienation that can be seen echoed in Boorstin’s (1963) ‘pseudoplaces’; Relph’s (1976) notion of placelessness; and in the classic distinction drawn by Tönnies (1887/1955) between the contrasting experiences of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft.

The close link drawn by Augé between non-places and travel, points to the deep suspicion with which mobility and mobile subjects have been regarded vis-a-vis notions of community that have stressed settled, organic sociability. Indeed mobility has consistently (if not inevitably) been framed as a threat to settled, social life, and those who move have often been entangled within ‘regimes of mobility’ that have sought to sequester and control the putative danger offered by the mobile subject (Cresswell 2001). Thus, the experience of non-places for many mobile subjects has been marked by the imposition of new ‘ordeal of solitude’ that stem from the subject’s putative position beyond the relational, sociability of place (Augé 1995: 93). Yet, to endure an ‘ordeal of solitude’, is not to suggest that a subject is outside dense webs of sociality, since as Cresswell (2006: 5) argues, mobility as distinct from movement, ‘does not exist in an abstract world of social space and social time, but is a meaningful world of social space and social time’. Consequently, this paper will argue that the solitude of the traveller is a fabrication within which individuals stand both ‘individualised’ by the state’s identity practices and embraced by a bio-power that is intimately concerned with the creation of place and the relationships of individual subjects to place. To travel is not to be positioned beyond place and social relations, rather it is to move within and between networks of place that are simultaneously physical and representational.

This paper seeks to highlight the place making work of states as they territorialise ‘regimes of mobility’ through the creation and administration of travel documents. Passports and their ilk have not been accorded a significant amount of attention by scholars (for an exception see Salter 2003; Torpey 2000) and to a significant degree passports have faded into the material unconscious which is woven through our lives. But this disappearance has not been a function of the relative insignificance of the passport, rather it has been a consequence of its ubiquity. On this point, Thrift (2000) draws on Billig’s (1995) seminal work on banal nationalism to suggest that we need to take a deeper account of the ‘small things’ such as files, documents and bureaucratic agents in the assemblage and ordering of the contemporary world. Here banality does not signify unimportance, but rather the ways in which the very ubiquity of ideas and ob-
jects hides in plain sight their importance as ordering devices. Thus ‘our’ passport disappears for many of us (‘white’, bourgeois academics) since it forms part of the material swarm that accompanies our everyday experiences and exists as an intermediary which offers us little hindrance. As a consequence, we take the passport for granted, and in doing so implicitly universalise ‘our’ relatively unproblematic experience of mobility as the norm (Crang 2002). Yet travel documents are complex objects whose contingent genealogies provide an aperture through which we can begin to see the intricate play between imagination and territorialisation working in highly uneven ways.

In order to understand the ‘regimes of mobility’ that have been constructed by states to embrace travelling subjects, Cresswell (2001) calls upon us to trace the production of mobility: the varied conditions of its assemblage, the discourses of threat and security that frame it, and the varied targets and effects that accompany it. With this in mind, this paper tentatively traces two strands in the complex webs of place and placelessness that accompanied travellers as they moved in and out of New Zealand between World War One (WW1) and World War Two (WW2). We begin by tracing a brief genealogy of the passport before shifting to situate that discussion in the specific context of the assemblage of a travel document system in New Zealand. To situate these arguments, the paper concludes with two case studies: the construction of a trans-Tasman place of mobility encompassing New Zealand and Australia after WW1; and the restriction of passports to Maori between WW1 and WW2.

SITUATING THE PASSPORT

Given the ubiquity of the passport as the *sine qua non* of legitimate, international movement, it is perhaps surprising to realise that its emergence has been the result of neither a sudden ‘big bang’ nor its steady diffusion across the international landscape. Rather, the object we call the passport—what constitutes it, its purpose vis-à-vis mobility, and the relationship it demarcates between states and subjects—has been fabricated in response to emergent problems in mobility. Thus, despite a veneer of standardisation, the use of passports as ordering documents has been deeply fragmented in practice (Mongia 1999). Within this fragmented landscape, Torpey (1998: 21) places the state at the centre of his analysis of mobility by arguing that alongside the assumed monopoly on violence that Weber identified as a key characteristic of the state, ‘modern states, and the international state system of which they are a part, have expropriated from individuals and private entities the ‘legitimate ‘means of movement”. Mobility represents a key field of intervention for the state, and a field within which individuals have increasingly become ‘embraced’ by par-
ticular states in efforts to define the conditions of legitimate mobility for their own ends. In this context, travel documents such as the passport represent a distillation of states’ concerns with mobility, and as such their organisation provides a significant way of understanding the intersection of place, power and mobility.

In itself, the passport contains very little intrinsic power to order because it offers no guarantees of movement to its bearer. Rather, it links an individual with a state and provides a state sanctioned identity for an individual. States are under no formal obligation to accept the bearer of a passport and states have no right to intervene in decisions made apropos the acceptability of a particular individual. In these limitations, passports reflect the common doctrines of sovereignty—all states are equal, and no state has a right to interfere in the internal affairs of another state—that frame (if not guide) formal relationships between states. In its entanglement with questions of sovereignty, the passport is clearly bound up with what Foucault (1991) characterised as the central concern of sovereignty which was to ensure the survival of the state: a concern partially addressed through the state’s demarcation and control of the mobility of people and objects across its territory. Yet he also suggested that the state’s concern with its own survival was increasingly counterpointed by a concern with the welfare of the population, the potential for its improvement, and the concomitant strengthening of the state that might arise from this interest. This interest in ‘the population’, and a desire to foster its improvement represented a biopolitical orientation distinct from either the exercise of sovereign power associated with the survival of the state or disciplinary power enacted through and upon individuals (Foucault 1977).

The practice and maintenance of sovereign and disciplinary and biopolitical power is intimately bound up into the production of place. Rose (1999: 34) captures this point where he writes that power is intimately spatial insofar as it involves ‘marking out a territory in thought and inscribing it in the real, topographizing it, investing it with powers, bounding it by exclusions and defining who or what can rightfully enter’. Mobility represents a specific field of concern within which the troika of sovereign, disciplinary and biopolitical power intersect to produce particular governmental assemblages in places that are defined by states as being particularly sensitive. Here the airport has emerged as the paradigmatic sovereign-disciplinary-biopolitical place within which individuals submit themselves to the rituals of authoritarian ordering associated with crossing from one state’s territory to another (Adey 2004; Salt- er 2007). Border crossings such as airports are not neutral spaces of division but rather places of contest where the tense performances of state sovereignty
and governmental concern are played out on a daily basis. Salter (2006:172) highlights the fraught territorialisation of the border where he notes that, in the context of the United States border, searches made by the Customs and Border Patrol, ‘are reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at the border’. At one level, disciplinary techniques are yoked to an ongoing sovereign concern with survival: concerns that are most sharply articulated and practiced in border places. But the specific use of disciplinary techniques in a place, such as an airport, goes hand in hand with a broader biopolitical interest in populations. Thus, the territorialisation of mobility involves the construction of particular sites of mobility, such as ports or airports, which are framed by an obsessive concern with verifying, fixing and maintaining the identity of individuals. However, the work done in these places is not done in isolation because the obsessive concern with individuality that marks the organisation of such sites is given power and meaning by the entwined imagination and administration of threat and potential that accompany states’ biopolitical appraisals of their own and others populations.

For the individual who passes through the places of mobility, through the verification trials, and finally from one state to another, they are never beyond the entanglements of place. Rather the documents that purport to verify their identity and status vis-a-vis a particular state provide powerful allies to travellers as they both attempt to bridge the different places of state territorialisation and stretch the place-making embrace of states. Thus, while passports (perhaps the most visible of the traveller’s documentary allies) may seem to represent a ubiquitous token to be exchanged and verified in the right of passage that constitutes the customs desk, their necessity and the manner of their issue is a banal reminder of the enduring place-making actions of states and their embrace of individuals and populations. Our task is to trace the banal assemblage of passport systems and with it the quiet geographical imagination embedded in those systems. To this end, the remainder of the paper addresses itself to a closer examination of the administration of New Zealand’s emerging passport system, prior to the Second World War.

FRAMING THE ‘NEW ZEALAND’ PASSPORT

The relationship between the New Zealand state and the ‘New Zealand’ passport has been enigmatic. For one, the de facto existence of a passport issued by the New Zealand state has not necessarily been matched by the de jure existence of a New Zealand passport. A situation which has owed much to the shifting limits of the New Zealand state’s sovereignty within the British Empire. This gap was evident in the Passport Act 1946 (PA 1946) which provided the
first explicit statutory basis for the Minister of Internal Affairs to ‘issue passports in New Zealand to British subjects or British protected persons’ (PA 1946: s.3(1)). In this context, a British passport was defined as a, ‘passport issued by or on behalf of the Government of any part of His Majesty’s dominions, whilst a British subject included ‘a person who in New Zealand is entitled to all political and other rights, powers, and privileges to which a natural-born British subject is entitled’ (PA 1946: s.2). Thus, whilst the PA 1946 provided recognition of the New Zealand state’s de facto sovereignty (a position that was formally codified when the New Zealand government finally adopted the State of Westminster in 1947), it simultaneously reaffirmed a deep continuity with Britain and the ascription of New Zealanders as fundamentally British in identity. Moreover, and notwithstanding the formal equality of states within the Westphalian system, the New Zealand state’s ability to unilaterally give shape to the conditions of international mobility has been limited, vis-à-vis the soft power of states such as the United Kingdom and the United States, to define the regimes of international mobility. Nonetheless, in its relationships with the South Pacific states (especially, Samoa, Fiji, Tonga, the Cook Islands, and Niue) the New Zealand state has been able and willing to exercise a significant definitional power in shaping the networks of mobility between these states and New Zealand. Moreover, whilst the New Zealand state’s power to define the conditions of mobility for New Zealand passport holders travelling abroad has been circumscribed, the corresponding desire to territorialise the conditions of entry into New Zealand has been enthusiastically supported and defended in both the political and popular realms.

Framed between these uncertainties, the discourses which have accompanied the emergence of New Zealand’s passport system, have been characterised by a sense of resigned inevitability. This point was no better expressed than by the Under-Secretary of Internal Affairs, Joseph Heenan (11/12/1936: unpaged) who while reflecting upon the British position at the 1926 Passport Conference, glumly concluded that ‘There is not much which can be suggested in New Zealand to improve matters. While all other countries of the world insist upon the production of a passport to enter their territory New Zealand can only fall into line by seeing that its people travelling overseas are provided with passports to facilitate their landing’. Heenan’s reflections are a small illustration of what Belich (2001) suggested was the process of recolonisation in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries through which the emergent economic and political interests of New Zealand became progressively reframed according to a dominant, and dominating relationship with Britain. Yet this sense of inevitability has served to hide the banal work of New Zealand’s administrators as they have sought to utilise travel documents for varying bio-political ends.

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It is on this banal work and its territorialisation that the following argument focuses upon.

In a memorandum drafted by the Crown Law Office in preparation for the introduction of new passport legislation in 1934, the role of New Zealand’s nascent 19\textsuperscript{th} century colonial government in issuing passports was recalled. In 1892, the Colonial Secretary reported, ‘it has not been deemed necessary to establish a passport system in New Zealand and that therefore no rules have been made’; whilst a year later the Colonial Secretary noted having no recollection of issuing any passports at all (Crown Solicitor 22/11/1934). However, lest we think that the absence of an organised passport system reflected the unimportance of international movement to New Zealand during the late 19\textsuperscript{th} century, we should note that between 1871 and 1885 over 250,000 migrants arrived in New Zealand (for a sense of scale New Zealand’s European/Pakeha population was only approximately 250,000 in 1871) (Bloomfield 1984). Moreover, in 1874 net migration was 38,000 a figure not bettered until 2002. However, such movement was not without its threatening, mobile ‘Other’. From the late nineteenth century onwards the mobility of non-British subjects, especially Chinese, into and within the Empire was problematised, as was the migration of Indians throughout the British Empire. In particular, the latter proved troublesome to the proponents of exclusion because of their nominal status as British subjects (albeit of the ‘wrong’ colour). Both Chinese and Indian migrants were the targets of a regular public clamour for exclusion and an ongoing legislative search for an impenetrable means of exclusion throughout Britain’s self-governing colonies and Dominions (Martens 2006).

Writing at the end of Queen Victoria’s reign, the discourses of fear and threat commonly associated with ‘Asiatic’ mobility were vividly captured by William Pember Reeves. Collectively, argued Reeves (1902), New Zealand and Australia were distinctive in the Empire because of the absence of any ‘race-fissures’ within their populations: an assertion that rather ignored the long history of indigenous resistance to colonial rule in both colonies (Belich 1988). However, the situation was not without danger, since for Reeves (1902: 328), the proximity of New Zealand and Australia to the ‘swarming hives of Southern and Eastern Asia’ meant that both countries were faced with immigration from people ‘without the ability to discover the Far South for themselves, or build a civilisation there, [who] are prepared in multitudes to use the discoveries of the white man and build on the foundations laid by his pioneers’. Reeves was a loud but not isolated advocate of immigration exclusion, and the widespread desire to exclude ‘Asiatic’ immigrants in both Australia and New Zealand provided a ongoing field for sovereign self-definition and a point of conflict with
the Imperial authorities in the United Kingdom (Borrie 1991; Brawley 1993).

Prior to WW1 two counterpointing strands existed in New Zealand in relation to mobility: a strand that saw an active role for the state in encouraging the peopling of New Zealand with British migrants; and a strand that saw a lurking threat in the proximity of mobile ‘Asiatic’ peoples to the north of New Zealand. It was not until the outbreak of WW1 in August 1914 that the mobility of British subjects in New Zealand was significantly problematised and embraced by the New Zealand state. The imperatives of participating in an industrial war in Europe profoundly transformed the bio-political interests of those states involved, the scale and scope of states’ involvement in areas previously outside their purview, and the territorialisation of mobility (Salter 2003). The war called for the massive mobilisation of labour power (both economic and military) and saw an increasingly acute recognition of the state’s population as a strategic resource which needed to be sequestered and harnessed. Under these circumstances, the mobile subject emerged as a doubly problematic figure: a person who might be actively working for an enemy state; or one whose lack of work would harm the war effort of one’s own state. Thus, in New Zealand and in contrast to the vigorous and consistent link that had been drawn between political sovereignty, ‘racial’ identity and immigration exclusion in relation to the ‘race alien’, the introduction of more widespread travel restrictions and documentary requirements during WW1 emerged to encompass the movement of both aliens and New Zealand’s British subjects, as the mobile subject was redefined as intrinsically problematic.

The emergence of a recognisably modern security apparatus concerned with mobility in New Zealand can be traced to the authoritarian doctrine of state necessity outlined by the jurist and Attorney-General John Salmond (Frame 1995; Salmond 1924). Salmond argued that where the existence of the state was threatened, the law needed to be set aside as was necessary in order to ensure the state’s survival. Salmond’s doctrine, framed by the outbreak of WW1, can be clearly discerned in the drafting and passage of the New Zealand’s War Regulation Act 1914 (WRA 1914) which enabled the government to govern through regulation rather than through the normal statutory process. Under the cloak of necessity provided by the WRA 1914, the New Zealand government introduced a slew of regulations restricting the mobility of different classes of individuals whose movement was calculated to be inimical to the war effort. There was no direct statutory basis for the regime of mobility (encompassing both a system of exit permits and passports) that gradually emerged and became more extensive during WW1. While the conclusion of WW1 saw a winding back of much of the extraordinary regulatory framework put in place under
the WRA 1914, the system of travel documentation was carried over into the post-WW1 years through the War Regulations Continence Act 1920. Indeed, it was not until the Passport Act 1934 (PA 1934) that some parts of the passport system were placed on a statutory basis and not until the Passport Act 1946 (PA 1946) that a New Zealand Passport was defined, and a passport required for movement in and out of New Zealand. Indeed, it was not until the Passport Act 1980 (PA 1980) that New Zealanders could receive a passport as of right.

Whilst the legal basis of the passport system in New Zealand gradually shifted, the ongoing administration of the passport system was not fundamentally altered by the change. Schmitt (1922/1985: 13) writing in relation to the exercise of sovereign power argued that its essence was not necessarily the ability to coerce or rule, but rather, ‘the monopoly to decide’. A monopoly that carries with it the power to define the exception and a monopoly which is most acutely expressed in those bordering processes that are concerned with the edges of state space (Salter 2006). On this point, Foucault (1991: 211) suggested that rather than imposing laws on people, governing had increasingly become a question of distributing things, by which he meant, ‘employing tactics rather than laws, and even of using laws themselves as tactics – to arrange things in such a way that, through a certain number of means, such-and-such ends may be achieved’. Seen through this lens, the ‘monopoly to decide’ was an integral tactic in the administration of New Zealand’s passport system, as well as a range of other border controls that emerged at the same time.

In particular, both the Undesirable Emigrants Exclusion Act 1919 and the Immigration Restriction Amendment Act 1920 introduced administrative discretion as a novel tactic to achieve the goal of immigration exclusion that had animated and frustrated immigration discourse in New Zealand since the late nineteenth century. This monopoly in relation to passports was spelt out by the Department of Internal Affairs who referenced an earlier Crown Law opinion that stated, ‘The issue of a passport and renewals thereof are prerogative acts, and the passport is the property of the Crown…. To concede to him [a Magistrate] the power to issue directions or to make orders in respect thereof would be most derogatory to the dignity of the Crown and to the prerogative itself’ (Secretary of Internal Affairs 23/8/1966: unpaged). The Secretary of Internal Affairs reinforced this argument by suggesting that, ‘I regard the issue or non-issue of a New Zealand passport as being a matter between the New Zealand Government and its citizens’ and that consequently, ‘A Court should not try and should not be allowed to try to make the New Zealand Government a party to proceedings before it’. Moreover, such a monopoly was, formally at least, ‘absolutely unfettered’ although administrators were advised
that ‘you should not restrict or refuse a passport unless there are legal grounds or grounds of principle to support your decision’ (Secretary of Internal Affairs 29/9/1966: unpaged). It is within this murky area of administrative discretion and the banal imaginative geographies embedded in the exercise of this discretion that the paper now turns.

**TERRITORIALISING THE NEW ZEALAND PASSPORT**

Recognition of the importance of the mundane administrative practices associated with the governance of passport systems can be situated within efforts to tease apart and accord agency to different elements of the state. O’Tuathail and Dalby (1998), for example, argue for the need to seriously consider the significant activities of a wider range of quiet actors in shaping the relationships between states, and between states and their citizens. This section of the paper briefly examines two cases where calculations of place and security framed the production of highly uneven regimes of mobility by passport officials: first, the post-WW1 re-negotiation of the documentary requirements for travel between New Zealand and Australia; and second, the framing of Maori as problematic travellers by the New Zealand state after WW1.

Australia is New Zealand’s nearest significant neighbour and connections between the two countries run very deep. A feature of the relationship between the two countries has been a long tradition of individuals crisscrossing the Tasman Sea, and an equally enduring concern at the mobility of ‘race aliens’ (Belich 1997). The outbreak of WW1 precipitated a reterritorialisation of travel in both New Zealand and Australia. In the case of New Zealand, the British requirement for travellers entering the United Kingdom to carry a passport meant that the majority of New Zealand travellers were quickly forced to get passports. Exit permits issued by the Minister of Internal Affairs were introduced during November 1915 as a measure to prevent military age men fleeing New Zealand (especially to Australia and the United States) to avoid national registration and the threat of military conscription (Henry 2003). As the war progressed exit permits came to operate as a de facto travel document in lieu of a passport for New Zealanders travelling to Australia (Allen 15/11/1916). In this case, the introduction of an exit permit scheme and the expansion of its use was not directly driven by an externally imposed demand as had happened with the need to issue passports, but rather by the evolving biopolitics which framed the formation of a war apparatus that increasingly enveloped New Zealand’s population and which sought to orientate its activities towards the prosecution of total warfare. In this context, the movement of some subjects, and in particular military age men, came to be defined as inimical to a broader
biopolitical programme orientated towards the pursuit of victory in Europe.

Whilst the exit permit scheme reterrorialised the limits of legitimate international mobility and gathered the discretion to issue such permits in the office of the Minister of Internal Affairs, it never sought to totally curtail such movement. Rather, to use an idea from Deleuze (1992), the exit permit system represented a striation of space rather than a technology of total enclosure. Indeed, the permit system was itself designed to be more administratively flexible (for some) than the passport system. On this point, the Australian Prime Minister, William Hughes, noted in correspondence to his New Zealand counterpart that ‘A permit is a much less formal document than a passport, is more quickly obtained, and involves the payment of no fee’ (Hughes 25/10/1916: unpaged). Likewise New Zealand’s Acting Prime Minister, James Allen, indicated the need to ‘avoid inconvenience’ and not to ‘interfere more than possible’ with movement across the Tasman Sea (Allen 11/11/1916: unpaged). Allen recognised the economic necessity of enduring the mobility of some individuals when he noted that in relation to shearers and slaughter men, ‘every facility will be given to these men to migrate backwards and forwards between the Commonwealth [Australia] and New Zealand’ (Allen 11/11/1916: unpaged). As a result, instructions issued to Passport Officers articulated a fine rule of difference between the ‘bona fide business man’ whose application was to be guided by ‘the character and the standing of the man’ through to the ‘New Zealander taking a holiday trip’ who needed to be watched very carefully and whose permit application in each case ‘should be referred to the Police’ (Hislop 6/3/1916: unpaged).

The permit assemblage which had emerged and which embodied a tension between a biopolitical desire to sequester and conserve labour and military resources, and the concurrent desire to support the movement of some subjects across the Tasman, was questioned following the end of WW1. For example, the editor of the Manawatu Evening Standard saw challenges to the passport and permit system as ‘eloquent testimony to the liberal regime under which British communities live and conduct their affairs’ (Manawatu Evening Standard 1919: 4). Nonetheless, the same writer felt that ‘to relax or to abolish the passport system would simply mean unlocking the door that has been erected to block such immigration [from aliens]’ and consequently, ‘the restrictions that are at present placed upon travel overseas are such that no sensible minded or patriotic citizen can possibly object to’ (Manawatu Evening Standard 1919: 4). In Parliament the Riccarton MP, George Witty, inquired as to when the passport and permit system would be abolished, given that so many people wanted to visit war graves in Europe (NZPD 1920). The Minister of Internal Affairs
responded that such documents would be necessary until the countries receiving New Zealand travellers changed their border formalities: an answer that obscured the fact that the permit system had been imposed by the New Zealand government on travellers and continued to be imposed for its own ends.

Official fudging on this matter might be explained in the exchanges which occurred in mid-1920 between New Zealand and Australian government officials. In late April 1920, the Secretary of Australia’s Home and Territories Department approached his New Zealand counterpart in the Department of Internal Affairs about the issue of travel permits (Hunt 22/4/1920). He pointed out that the purpose of the permit system, which had been to safeguard each country against the unauthorised departure of military age men, had been overtaken by events. The permit system he averred caused a significant amount of inconvenience to passengers and officials for no apparent end and consequently his Minister felt that permits could be safely removed for British subjects travelling between the two countries. Opinion amongst the various agencies in Wellington varied. The Comptroller of Customs (19/5/1920: unpaged) found no objection with the Australian proposal, as long as ‘permits or passports for aliens will still be necessary’, while the Department of Defence opposed the proposal, arguing that ‘until the New Zealand Government decides to cease prosecution of military defaulters who hitherto have escaped detection, this Department must protest against the removal of the present pass-port [sic] system as between Australia and New Zealand’ (Richardson 24/5/1920: unpaged). The ongoing ‘security’ concerns of the Defence Department carried the argument with the Secretary of Internal Affairs who pointed out to his Australian equivalent that New Zealand’s military authorities were still very interested in tracing and punishing military defaulters and hence the permit system would continue (Hislop 4/6/1920).

Notwithstanding the Defence Department’s opposition to any relaxation of the permit requirements, pressure was still being exerted upon the Department of Internal Affairs. The Manager of the Union Steam Ship Company (USSCo) wrote to the Secretary of Internal Affairs outlining the formidable array of entry formalities that needed to be conducted while passenger ships were in the stream noting that ‘very serious complaints have been made to us by passengers arriving from Sydney of the long detention in the stream…. [and] it is hardly to be wondered at that passengers who have missed connection with trains to Auckland and elsewhere should be strong in their expressions of indignation at the expense and inconvenience to which they are consequently subjected’ (Union Steam Ship Company 7/8/1920: unpaged). Under such pressure, the Secretary of Internal Affairs, James Hislop, convened a conference
of representatives from Internal Affairs, the Defence Department, the Police Department, and the Customs Department to discuss the future of the permit system for travel between New Zealand and Australia (Hislop 8/9/1920). At this September conference, the Defence Department’s representatives indicated that they were now less interested in punishing military defaulters and more concerned by the threat posed by Bolshevists and Soviet spies. On this matter, both the Secretary of Internal Affairs and the Police representative pointed out that the discretionary powers contained in the Undesirable Emigrants Aliens Act 1919 to deport such threatening individuals were more than sufficient for the Defence Department’s needs. Hislop also spelt out the uncomfortable reality of the relationship between New Zealand and Australia regarding the permit system. He noted that the effectiveness of the system was reliant upon both Australia and New Zealand sharing a common zeal but that he was afraid ‘as far as Australia was concerned, it was merely a formality, no systematic enquiries were being made into individual cases’ (Hislop 8/9/1920: unpaged). Given this reality and given the powers already available elsewhere, the departmental representatives decided that the permit system could be discontinued for naturally-born British subjects, a decision that was conveyed to shipping companies in mid-October 1920.

This decision did not mean an end to the need for travel documents between Australia and New Zealand but rather constituted a further reterritorialisation of mobility between the two countries that fused place and identity together to complete a matrix of travelling subjects and spaces of mobility. This reterritorialisation was sketched in correspondence exchanged between New Zealand’s Department of Internal Affairs and the Commonwealth’s Home and Territories Department in early November 1920 (Hislop 5/11/1920). Under the agreement struck by the two departments, natural-born British subjects constituted a privileged category of travelling subjects who would be able to move between Australia and New Zealand without documents by virtue of their birthplace. In contrast, both naturalised British subjects and aliens were still required to carry passports or Certificates of Identity to travel between Australia and New Zealand. This agreement drew a distinction between two classes of travelling subject. On one hand, the mobility of natural born British subjects was reconstituted as being unproblematic, while on the other hand, the place of birth of naturalised British subjects and aliens was used to define their mobility as intrinsically more problematic.Administrative distinctions which can be partially understood in relation to the racial discourses of ‘whiteness’ and ‘purity’, that informed New Zealander’s responses to immigration during the early twentieth century. The mobility regime established by the agreement defined an Australasian mobility place and at the core of this place was the discursive
framing of a common ‘white’ British identity. Thus, while both countries were territorially separated, they shared a collective territorialisation shaped around the preeminent status of the natural born British subject as the *sine qua non* of a common Australasian identity and ultimately the unmarked (or undocumented) master traveller. The privileged status of the natural born British subject as the master travelling subject was constituted through an administrative imagination that mundanely affirmed New Zealand and Australia as common ‘British’ countries. A place framed not by physical geography but rather the specific imagination of a shared cultural and racial place.

The popular contours of the ‘geographical imagination’ that linked Australia and New Zealand through a common racialised identity as British were clearly articulated in the debate that surrounded the passage of the Immigration Restriction Amendment Bill in mid-1920. The Prime Minister, William Massey (*NZPD* 1920: 905), opened the debate by arguing that the purpose of the Bill was to give expression to the desire of New Zealanders ‘that this Dominion shall be what is often called a ‘white’ New Zealand’, before summing up the mood of Parliament with the observation that ‘Clearly, we want to keep the race as pure in this Dominion as it is possible to keep it’ (*NZPD* 1920: 908). Between these statements, an interesting exchange occurred between Massey and the Eastern Maori MP, Apirana Ngata, in relation to the status of Maori within this putatively ‘white’ Dominion. Ngata asked ‘what of the Maoris’ in reaction to a clause in the Bill which allowed the governor-general to exempt a nation from the proposed Act with the qualification that this power did not extend to any ‘aboriginal Native’ of an exempted nation. In response, Massey discursively whitened Maori by arguing that ‘The Maori is a European for our purposes…. The Maori has the same rights and privileges as the European, in every sense of the word’ (*NZPD* 1920: 907). Massey’s ‘whitening’ of Maori reflected a strong strand of Aryanism in the racial imagination of New Zealand’s politicians, public and officials where Maori could be accorded honorary ‘white’ status by giving them a proto-European genealogy (see Belich 2001; Tregear 1885).

Ngata’s complaint that the ‘white’ status of Maori was not reflected in the law was an astute one, given the growth in the use of ministerial discretion as a tactic of exclusion. Moreover, notwithstanding Massey’s assurance of an equality of status, the examination of passport policy in relation to Maori suggests that the use of administration discretion was framed by a series of racialised assumptions about the travelling Maori subject. In early 1924, the Minister of Internal Affairs, Richard Bollard (19/3/1924) forwarded a list of 36 Maori passport applicants to the Minister of Native Affairs. The applicants were proposing to travel to the British Empire Exhibition and the Minister of Internal
Affairs noted that the party had already reserved its passage on the SS Barrabool which was due to leave in mid-April. The Minister also pointed out that ‘Mr Moko [the party’s leader] stated that they were prepared to deposit any sum of money with the Government as a safeguard against any, or the whole, of the party becoming stranded abroad’ (Bollard 19/3/1924: unpaged). In reply, the Minister of Native Affairs, the future Prime Minister, Joseph Coates (24/3/1924), indicated that he had already had contact with Mr Moko in regards gaining permission to leave New Zealand. Looking beyond this specific case, the Minister argued that before any party of Maori was permitted to leave New Zealand a series of conditions needed to be complied with. These conditions included: 1) the cost of the return fares for the whole party should be deposited with the Department of Internal Affairs; 2) a sum of money sufficient to cover the accommodation costs of a party waiting for a return steamer should be deposited with the Department of Internal Affairs; and 3) accommodation for the whole party needed to have been procured before the party left New Zealand. The conditions set down by the Minister in his memorandum to the Minister of Internal Affairs were confirmed by Cabinet in late March 1924.

The surviving administrative files indicate a trickle of passport applications falling under this policy. In April 1928, Te Ari Pitama (29/3/1928) wrote to the Prime Minister, Joseph Coates, indicating that he was unable to deposit the requisite £100 with the Department of Internal Affairs and asking for advice. Coates (3/4/1928) made representations on behalf of Pitama to the Minister of Internal Affairs suggesting that the bond be waived on the stipulation that Pitama signed an undertaking not to make any call on the New Zealand Government while he was overseas. It appears, however, that this suggestion was not taken up and no passport was issued to Pitama (Coates 3/4/1928). In April the following year, the Department of Internal Affairs was approached by the Auckland lawyers, Wynyard, Wilson, Vallance & Holmden (11/4/1929), working on behalf of the Mormon Church. They noted the £100 bond required of Maori passport applicants and asked what legislation gave the Department the authority to exercise this requirement. Officers for the Under-Secretary of Internal Affairs (15/4/1929: unpaged) made no mention of the War Regulations Continuance Act 1920 under which passport regulations were made and instead, they pointed out that in the first instance, the issue of passports was a matter of royal prerogative and that consequently ‘the issue of a passport in favour of any person is not mandatory’ and secondly that ‘it has been decided by the Government in the case of Maoris applying for passports to insist on a deposit of £100 pounds to indemnify the government against any loss which might be sustained in repatriating them to the Dominion in the event of their becoming stranded overseas’. The implications of this tactic were spelt out in
letters by George Watene, Secretary of the Maori Agricultural College Old Boys Association, to both the Department of Native Affairs and the Department of Internal Affairs. Watene (15/4/1929: unpaged) noted that the restrictions placed on the travelling Maori public were ‘the first of its kind ever instituted in the history of New Zealand. It will practically blot out any hope for the Maori people ever travelling abroad. I do not see any reason for any such law, for you know as well as I do, that the travelling Maoris are very few and far between. It takes them all their time and money to procure the return fares and extras, let alone the £100 security’. Watene (15/4/1929: unpaged) ended his letter with the plea to ‘leave the Maoris on a par with the European people, and issue the passport to the Maori people, the same as usual as in the past years, for their service: here, abroad and in the homeland’. As a result, Cabinet consented to allow a party of Maori travelling under the aegis of the Mormon Church to travel to Honolulu but on the proviso that the church would be responsible for the repatriation costs of any of the Maori requiring assistance.

In mid-November 1937, the case of Wilson Potaka was brought to the attention of the Under Secretary of Internal Affairs, Joseph Heenan (17/11/1937). Potaka had been issued a passport after depositing a bond with Internal Affairs and had subsequently left New Zealand to travel to China. While in China, it was believed that he had intended to try and gain employment with the Flying Section of the General Chiang Kei-Shek’s Nationalist forces. However, en route to Hong Kong both his passport and money were reported stolen and consequently the New Zealand government was asked to repatriate Potaka. Using Potaka’s case as an exemplar, Heenan noted the wisdom of the 1924 policy and argued that the policy should be allowed to continue. A sentiment echoed in a handwritten note written by the Minister of Internal Affairs and appended to Heenan’s memorandum. Set alongside continuing support for this policy was recognition of the regular parties of travellers organised through the Mormon Church and the lack of trouble associated with these parties. Indeed, when this issue was revisited over a decade later, Potaka’s case represented precisely half of the cases where the policy of requiring deposits had been needed. Given this context it was suggested that ‘the present policy does not appear to be in accord with the modern view of the place of the Maori Race in the community’ (Harper 16/3/1948: unpaged). A view shared by both the Minister William Parry and the Prime Minister Peter Fraser. However, in changing the policy, Fraser indicated that while any restrictions on Maori as individual travellers should be removed, in the case of parties of Maori travelling some provision needed to remain. It seems that Fraser’s suspicion of travelling parties led to at least two teenage concert parties being dissuaded from leaving New Zealand because of the fear of the cost of repatriation (Anonymous 21/6/1961).
The policy of requiring Maori to provide a bond before a passport would be issued indicated a paternal assumption as to the problematic status of Maori as travellers. Thus, notwithstanding loud protestations as to the equal status of Maori and Pakeha before the law, the ongoing tactics of administrative discretion as exercised by agents with the Department of Internal Affairs and the Department of Native Affairs suggested the existence of a level of categorical suspicion attached to the mobility of Maori. Maori were problematic travellers because they were Maori, and in this sense they joined a constantly evolving collection of subjects —‘shirkers’, bolshevists, aliens, ‘race’ aliens, children, women, debtors— whose mobility was problematic for the state because of ontological claims about their limited ability to successfully govern themselves as responsible travelling subjects.

The tactics of a racialised paternalism evident in the policy towards Maori travellers profoundly but banally reterritorialised the place of the border in governing mobility. In suggesting that Maori travellers, like other problematic travellers, became the subjects of a categorical suspicion, the border as a distinct place of demarcation and passage disappears. In this sense, the border is placeless insofar as its role becomes attached not to a specific place but rather is constantly practiced in the daily interaction between the problematic subject and the state. Conversely, however, to talk of the border as being placeless is to ignore the materiality of the entanglement of subject and state. Rather, the border becomes embedded in a new series of places such as the Department of Internal Affair’s Passport Office, on the desk of the Minister of Native Affairs, or around the Cabinet table. It is in these places that the ongoing work of differentiation is conducted and where the mundane imagination of risk, subjects and other places was assembled in ways that produced significantly uneven regimes of mobility.

CONCLUSION

In these mundane agreements and processes of classification, we can begin to discern an entangled geography of placeness and placelessness whose contours have been defined not through explicit acts of imagination but rather through the quiet assemblage of administrative tactics around questions of risk, security, race and citizenship. Through these quiet tactics, states have assembled regimes of mobility which constitute individuals as variously problematic or unproblematic travellers: classifications which in turn are entangled in the territorialisation of mobility.

As has been suggested in this paper mobility is not necessarily a synonym for
placelessness. Rather, the regimes of mobility through which states shape the
movement of individuals require the intense and ongoing imagination of place
and the relationship between place and individuals. A relationship framed
by assumptions as to which travelling subjects are ‘in place’ and which are
‘out of place’. Thus, we saw, in the case of trans-Tasman travel between New
Zealand and Australia, a renegotiation of the regime of mobility, which had
been previously created during the First World War to ensure the immobility
of military age men. The regime of mobility that emerged from these nego-
tiations created a common trans-Tasman place within which the mobility of
national born British subjects was imagined as both desirable and unpro-
blematic. However, the supported mobility of these subjects was predicated on
the concomitant immobility of other racialised subjects: an immobility which
was created through the same place making calculations as those supporting
the mobility of natural-born (read ‘white) British subjects. Likewise, the in-
ternational mobility of Maori was framed in racialised assumptions as to both
the limited capabilities of Maori as successful travellers and the nature of the
world beyond New Zealand. The effect, rhetorically at least, was to fix Maori
in place as problematic travellers.

In using the examples of trans-Tasman mobility and the constrained mobility
of Maori, it is not a matter of supposing that the state ceased to embrace those
subjects whose mobility has been defined as unproblematic, or that the state
necessarily embraced any tighter problematic travellers. Rather, we see the
mundane assemblage of new places of mobility. Places produced through the
quiet tactics of official discretion and the use of travel documents as a means of
supporting or hindering the mobility of different subjects. Seen in these terms,
place simultaneously emerges as a result of the state’s concern with mobility
and a resource to be used to give shape to that concern. Consequently, to move
is not to be beyond place or to be placeless, rather, it is be entangled in complex
and shifting regimes of mobility: regimes whose work is intimately related to
the production and attachment of place to travelling subjects.

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