

YOU'RE GIVING ME A HEADACHE:
A POLITICAL–CULTURAL TEXTUAL CRITIQUE OF ALT/FAR-RIGHT
ANTI-INDIGENOUS THOUGHT ON INDIGENOUS ISSUES IN AOTEAROA
NEW ZEALAND

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ABSTRACT

This paper provides a critical critique of alt/far-right political thought on indigenous issues in Aotearoa New Zealand. In doing so it examines the opening preface of the published work, One Treaty, One Nation entitled, 'Some of the Myths on which the Treaty Industry is Based' by emerging alt/far-right publisher, Tross Publishing. A selection of five of the twenty-three so-called myths put forward by the authors are considered. The work is grounded in sociological thought with an exploration of the relevance of Australian Aboriginal academic Aileen Moreton-Robinson's White Possessive Doctrine and Veracini's commentary of 'On Settling', and Goulet's development economics. This piece ends by engaging and providing commentary on what the collective future of Aotearoa New Zealand should look like based on these recent developments in moving towards a collective future.

Keywords: Settler colonialism; indigenous studies; Hobson's Pledge; Māori identity; New Zealand alt/far right politics

INTRODUCTION

The collaborator speaks: How this research came to be.

In 2013, I began a doctoral thesis at the University of Wollongong. In my second year, at the Taupō District Libraries, I came across *When Two Cultures Meet: The New Zealand Experience* by physicist and mathematician John Robinson (2012) and published by Tross Publishing. I read the first ten pages of the book when I arrived home and felt traumatised by its content. I asked the Māori academic community on Facebook about the publisher and the

author, and the general response I received was that it was not worth my time to read this book.

In 2016, I came across the book, *Twisting the Treaty: A Tribal Wealth Grab for Wealth and Power* (Robinson *et al.* 2013) in the local Paper Plus shop, which had also placed a similar title, *One Treaty, One Nation: The Book Every New Zealander Should Read* (Barr *et al.* 2015), in the Māori section of the bookstore. This led me to complain to the staff and the company that these books should not be placed in that section because they could be considered offensive to Māori customers. Approximately two weeks later, for my thirty-third birthday, my mother bought me these books from Paper Plus because she thought they would be useful for my doctoral research.

Despite my initial protests, I began to read one of the books. *One Treaty, One Nation* (Barr *et al.* 2015) has a preface titled ‘Some of the myths on which the treaty industry is based’, for which no author name is provided. Over the following several days of reflection, I concluded that the content of Barr *et al.* (2015), while somewhat amusing and laughable, is also highly alarming for the future of us all as a society here in Aotearoa New Zealand. Approximately five weeks later, Dr. Don Brash unleashed his new project, Hobson’s Pledge, an alt/far-right lobby group dedicated towards ending the alleged Māori special privilege, favouritism, and advocating for the equality of all regardless of race, ahead of the 2017 New Zealand general election (NZ Herald 2017).

Following these events, I thought it important to provide the following critical analysis and an indigenous response to what are generally considered the ‘alt/far-right anti-treatyist and anti-scholarship’ attitudes on indigenous issues in Aotearoa New Zealand raised in the preface of *One Treaty, One Nation* (Barr *et al.* 2015). This critique analyses the preface of Barr *et al.* (2015) titled ‘Some of the myths on which the treaty industry is based’ (Unknown 2015). The editor of *Mana Magazine*, Joe Trinder (2014, no page numbers) writes of Tross Publishing, stating the following about white hate groups in Aotearoa New Zealand:

[these groups are] well resourced and funded by millionaires, with a publishing company, Tross Publishing. Tross publishes false historical facts, claiming Maoridom gave away their land and estates to British colonists [...] and other bombastic claims that colonisation didn’t decimate the Māori race, that hardly anyone suffered and that in fact colonisation was a saviour.

Given that very little is known about Tross Publishing and modern far-right

discourses on indigenous issues in Aotearoa, the aim of this article is to highlight its potential as an obstacle to indigenous development and *mana motuhake* or indigenous sovereignty, and what Simon (2016) deems ‘the collective future’ of Aotearoa New Zealand, given that the materials published by Tross lie within such anti-indigenous discourses. In addition, this article represents a continuation of a series of papers on the state of *mana motuhake* in relation to the settler colonial state.

POSITIONALITY

Works of this nature are not new to the political and social landscape of Aotearoa New Zealand (eg. Scott 1995; Mitchell 1990; Reilly 1996). However, what makes the works produced by Tross Publishing worth examining is that they are the most modern version of the white supremacist phenomenon of publishing rhetoric and misinformation that seeks to misdirect the national political and social conversation. Thus they are contributing to and shaping modern political and social views on a range of topics in Aotearoa New Zealand. The author(s) of the preface of Barr *et al.* (2015) are highly dismissive of people who engage in debate on issues that are important to Māori and refer to people who attempt to promote Māori rights and development as ‘collaborators’. This qualifies the works as anti-treatyist and anti-scholarship (Hill 2002; Meihana 2017). It is interesting to note that they address those that argue for Treaty Rights and space retrievers for indigenous peoples as ‘collaborators’ (Barr *et al.* 2015) The authors also state that ‘collaborators’ misrepresent New Zealand history so that in every situation – past and present – European New Zealanders are portrayed as the wrongdoers and ‘Māori’ (now part-Māoris) as the so-called ‘victims’ (Barr *et al.* 2015). The discussion is furthered by the view that people distort history as a pre-condition for a tribal grab for power and wealth and, in doing so, foster animosity between *Pākehā* (the perpetrators) and Māori (the victims) (Barr *et al.* 2015). With such attitudes in play here, it is important to focus on how these attitudes inform the overall conversation and the work in question.

Therefore, the following critical indigenous studies essay answers three key questions in response to these expressed attitudes. The first of these is: why are the outputs produced by Tross Publishing a threat to the realisation of *mana motuhake*? In relation to the first question we must also ask: why are the outputs by Tross Publishing a hindrance to achieving settling and a collective future? And lastly, for the future of critical ethnic studies, politics and history in the Aotearoa New Zealand context we must explore: what are the problems identified with the textual and narrative interpretation of the authors? What

are the motivations for writing such misinformation and/or rhetoric? These questions will be answered within a *Kaupapa Māori* research framework. Due to the sheer number of myths (the authors' term) within the preface section of the book, only a selected number will be addressed. Furthermore, to avoid confusion, I (as the author of the present article) will refer to myself as '*kaituhi*', which translates to 'writer' or 'author', and to the Barr *et al.* (2015) writer(s) as 'authors'

MORETON-ROBINSON'S WHITE POSSESSIVE DOCTRINE

Aboriginal academic Aileen Moreton-Robinson created a doctrine of thought (Moreton-Robinson 2004; *ibid*, 2015) which I refer to as the White Possessive Doctrine. In 2016, Simon (2016) demonstrated the application of her work to the Aotearoa New Zealand context. In this doctrine, effectively what the British did in terms of colonisation was promote a system where race and British superiority shaped the law in Aotearoa New Zealand. Additionally, it created a society based on white possession where the traditional law of the indigenous population, *tikanga*, is butchered and/or suppressed in that it is incorporated into general law in ways that suit the coloniser and are usually morphed into ways the coloniser understands. This is also where the imported law is crafted to the needs and desires of the colonising population over those that originally held *mana whenua*. This pathway is shaped and approved by the Judiciary and government policy. As an example, the principles of the Treaty were affirmed and defined by the Court of Appeal and have ever since been incorporated into government policy in regards to Māori issues and rights. (Moreton-Robinson 2015; Simon 2016; *ibid* 2020)

In this system, the Crown promotes that only the Crown can hold possession within the territory of the nation state. While doing so, governments dehumanised *hapū* and *iwi* in order to legitimise their actions and then sought to make us fully human by exercising benevolence and virtue in its many forms. In this act the government has a need to look benevolent to remove the moral position held by *hapū* and *iwi*. That possession works ideologically (as a set of beliefs) to render and neutralise the nation as a white possessive (ie Sovereignty was ceded to the Crown). 'White possessive sovereignty' is what results from that possession – this is where the administration is usually white and is patriarchally male. Through the law, the government legislated the legal theft of indigenous lands (New Zealand Land Wars and incidents like Ngatapa or Rangiaowhia) of the indigenous population (Moreton-Robinson 2015; Simon 2016).

DEVELOPMENT ETHICS

To be recognised as fully human and to challenge the ideas from the alt/far-right about the place of Māori in Aotearoa New Zealand society, I suggest we explore the idea of Goulet's development ethics. In 1971 Goulet (1971, 236) asked the question: '[W]hat kind of development can be considered "human"?'. 'Development' means 'changes which allow human beings, both as individual persons and as members of groups, to move from one condition of life to one which is more human in some meaningful way' (Goulet 1960, 14). In this regard, the true purpose of this article is to challenge and bring forth, even if only in academic argument, a better life condition for Māori by providing grounded, scholarly argument that improves said condition by confronting the misinformation of the authors with fact and, in the process, enlightening people and alleviating the burden of racism and white supremacy.

Gaspar comments that 'Goulet's definition of the scope of development ethics combined a broad view of it as social change ethics, with an implied core audience consisting of those who see themselves as working in development studies or development policy' (Gaspar 2008, 454). The ultimate aim of development, he argued, was to provide an existence where all humans have the opportunity to lead full human lives (Goulet, 1971). The ideal was to have full, comprehensive human development (Goulet 1979, 556). This is similar to the Sarvodaya idea that the concept of human development or, in this case being allowed to be fully human, means there is 'respect for all life and the concept of the well-being of all' (1979, 559). In relation to the topic in hand, when one writes with the clear intention of continuing the suppression of another group within society so that they may not develop equally and equitably, this must be questioned. For 'the aim of this work is to thrust debates over economic and social development into the arena of ethical values...' (Goulet, 1971: vii as cited in Gaspar 2008) Ultimately, work like this is grounded in a real world pursuit of fairness and possibly justice. In relation to Indigenous Studies, Goulet's ideas are ultimately related to the goal of decolonization. With this in mind, we will now explore a key theory for this critique known as Veracini's commentary on Goodin's *On Settling*.

VERACINI'S COMMENTARY ON ON SETTLING

Veracini (2014) makes some valuable observations about the ideas expressed in Goodin's (2012) work *On Settling*. Goodin (2012) identifies five phases that are required for 'settling' (*i.e.*, the settling by a settler population into a new land), which Veracini (2014) summarises in four stages in reference to Goodin (2012).

In this frame, the first stage is called 'settling down', which is a situation and a place. This is followed by 'settling in', which is the settler/invaser accommodating to the new circumstances and the new place. 'Settling up' is the following stage with the people that have been displaced, unsettled or otherwise wronged in the process of settling are acknowledged. In the fourth stage, 'settling for' is where the settler/invaser learns to cope in the newly settled circumstances.

Veracini (2014) states that without these four preliminary phases, there cannot be phase five, which is 'settling on', referring to settling on a belief or value, project or commitment, way of being or way of living. Without undergoing phases one to four, there cannot be a genuine political capacity for the original population. For Goodin (2012), 'settling' remains territorial, and even if it no longer refers to 'empty lands', should not be understood metaphorically. The terms 'place', 'situation' and 'circumstances' are fundamentally spatial terms; in *On Settling*, (Goodin, 2012) the term 'settling' is at first literally about an original displacement.

Veracini (2014, 39) states that only settled people 'craft narrative identities and live up to them'. The displacement of an indigenous population and the assumption of patriarchal white sovereignty are thus intimately linked. In Aotearoa New Zealand, the introduction or the settling down ended in an agreement (Te Tiriti), with signatory *hapū* referring to the place of *Tauīwi* and the declaration of *Terra Nullius* or questionable 'conquest' (as a legal term of art) for the remaining land. The assertion of patriarchal white sovereignty and conquest as legal art was followed by the mass displacement and overtaking of *mana motuhake* and the assertion instead of patriarchal white sovereignty and possessiveness. In Aotearoa New Zealand, the phase of 'settling up' refers to the period from 1975 to the present, which increasingly involves the recognition of the status of indigenous people, in this case Māori, and a creation of a path towards reconciliation and/or recognition (which I believe continues to require a great deal of work).

In the modern context, there has been no project undertaken to attempt to find agreement on the values and commitments important to Aotearoa New Zealand society. There is no provision to provide political equity for the indigenous population and thus no genuine political capacity for the displaced indigenous population. For example, it would be important for the constitution to express such agreed societal values and commitments. Constitutional transformation would enable a settler colonial society to begin the process of 'settling for' because such amendment can be considered a project related to values. For such amendment to occur, the values upon which governance should depend must

be agreed upon. In Aotearoa New Zealand, principles such as *mana* and *mana motuhake* must be clearly understood and reached. The current treaty-based dialogue between the state, wider society and indigenous groups confuses the issue of indigenous development and rights, making it difficult to come to *māramatanga* or understanding. For example, constitutional transformation for Aotearoa New Zealand would mean that as a collective we could move past the white possessive history and move towards settling on common values about how the country can and should be governed. Such a vision would need to be ‘unsettling’ rather than based on pragmatic reasoning as proposed by Palmer and Butler (2016).

THE MISINFORMATION OF THE AUTHORS’ ‘PART-MĀORI’ IDENTITY

In my examination of the myths, I want to first address a concept that is found in the published works of Tross Publishing, including the preface of *One Treaty, One Nation* written by the authors. This is the alt/far-right idea grounded in blood quantum, a pseudo-identity called ‘Part-Māori’. Identity is extremely personal and the result of an internal process. Despite what the authors express, identity cannot be prescribed based on the judgement of others. Unfortunately, the authors’ attempt to deny individuals and groups their identity is not only highly offensive, it is highly imperialistic and paternalistic. These authors attempt to define an individual or a group of individuals in the same manner as a coloniser would. That is, the authors attempt to remove agency from the group or individual and enable the coloniser to define who and what that group or individual is, and who belongs to the indigenous population and groups. Tahu Kukutai (2004, 86) defines race and ethnicity as:

... [historically] a biological classification of humans on the basis of genetic makeup, manifest in physical traits. Contemporary definitions define race as a socially constructed category based on the identification of (1) a group marker that is transmitted through reproduction (e.g. skin colour); and (2) individual, group, and cultural attributes associated with that marker.

Kukutai (2004, 89) continues:

Biological attempts to identify indigenous peoples are not new. Scholars and governments have long taken an interest in the level of intermix within indigenous populations, indicated the rate of absorption into the mainstream population – an outcome often viewed as inevitable and desirable.

However, intermarriage and changing ideas about race have complicated how people self-identify, and are identified by others (Harris and Sim 2002). Increasingly, the treatment of ethnic groups as discrete is problematised by the ability and willingness for individuals to claim multiple affiliations. Kukutai (2004, 89) states the following:

[H]igh rates of intermarriage and institutional pressures to assimilate mean they [the indigenous population] comprise persons with diverse lifestyles, socioeconomic circumstances and identities. Their [indigenous peoples] claim as original or sovereign peoples also confers specific legal rights relating to ownership of land and natural resources, cultural preservation, and political representation. Given this, indigenous peoples tend to figure prominently in national debates on race, ethnicity, and resources.

As Roberts *et al.* (2004,1) notes, Māori belonging and identity is based on *whakapapa*. Researchers have highlighted that typically, the ‘view within Māori communities is that to be considered Māori, an individual must identify as a Māori and be descended from a Māori’ (Kukutai 2004, 95; Durie 1998; Karetū 1990; Walker, 2004).

Within Māori society, if the child has *whakapapa* – a link to a collective grouping of people – they are Māori. The need of the coloniser to define and categorise who is or who is not Māori is not only irrelevant but also insulting. The authors seem to be claiming that their way of knowing and the knowledge they possess from a *Pākehā* background, ontology and epistemology is superior to that of any Māori person or group. Such a view is Eurocentric and racist.

However, due to the authors’ apparent desire to categorise ethnicity according to their knowledge and ways of knowing, they missed the following important point articulated by Rangihau (1977); *whakapapa* comes with distinct knowledge, identity, politics and understanding. This point by Rangihau is important because the authors are denying the essence of being indigenous in Aotearoa New Zealand, and the fact that there is a connection for Māori through *whakapapa* and history to *iwi* and *hapū*. In addition, the authors are continuing the government-designed myth that Māori are homogenous and that Māori, not *rangatira* on behalf of *hapū*, signed the Treaty (Simon, 2016). As such, this government and settler/invader myth is about the erasure of *hapū/iwi* identity and, as a result, the need to recognise an alternative to possession and patriarchal white sovereignty.

It appears clear that the authors hold a position grounded in white privilege and whiteness by their need to control and define the identity of another and orientalise them. The authors' reaction to what the use of alt/far-right terms 'Māorification' personifies this kind of position. When Māori increase their known presence here in Aotearoa New Zealand, particularly in academia and politics, changing their accustomed 'landscape', Māori are asking *Pākehā* to give up that which they most covet – power (Simon, 2016). In their work, Barr *et al.* (2015) demonstrate that their reaction to Māori advancement and awareness of being is driven from a *Pākehā* knowledge system, and *Pākehā* ways of knowing and being. The authors attempt to continue the colonial project by further subjugating the indigenous population, albeit through the dissemination of ideas, by expressing ideas such as the only way to be Māori is on a blood-quantum basis such as being 'part-Māori' (Barr *et al.* 2015). Māori are forcing *Pākehā* to recognise that they are privileged because they are white, that they have inherited this privilege through violence underpinned by white supremacy via the process of colonisation in Aotearoa New Zealand, and that the settler colonial project known as 'New Zealand' should be questioned and dismantled.

In relation to the viewpoints raised by the authors, Anna Boswell (2015), in a book review titled *Histographophobia*, describes this phenomenon which highly relates to the ideas perpetuated by the authors' work. In this phenomenon, the use of the term 'New Zealander' uncritically replicates the displacement and replacement that are apparent in slippage in identity (from Māori to *Pākehā*/colonial to Kiwi) over time. It permeates the myth or story of New Zealand that it just 'took shape' – it just happened. These representations do not involve destructive un-making or re-making of an existing white life-world. Most of all, Māori are eerily absent from much of the discussion; when they do appear, they bear the myths of good race relations–sporting prowess and iconicity (Boswell 2015).

THE SUPPOSED 'MYTHS'

If settler colonial nations are to move forward to a collective future and towards settlement, as suggested by Veracini, the transmission of accurate information must be the basis of this. Therefore, the following section will outline then deconstruct what the authors deem to be myths in relation to indigenous issues here in Aotearoa New Zealand. The myth is quoted first, followed by the remarks of the authors on the issue. Therefore, according to the authors:

'The Maoris are indigenous to New Zealand.' Wrong. Unlike the Indians in North America and the Aborigines in Australia, who have

been on their land for thousands of years, the Maoris arrived in New Zealand about 1250 AD – a mere 400 years before Abel Tasman. At Cape Reinga there is a hillock that, according to Maori lore and the accompanying sign, the spirits of dead Maoris leave from on their journey home to Hawaiki, thus showing that even the Maoris don't believe that they are indigenous [sic]. (Unknown 2015, 9–10)

However, in contrast to the authors' assertion, Cherokee academic Jeff Corntassel (2003, 75) notes the following:

The question of 'who is indigenous?' is best answered by indigenous communities themselves. As a testament to this, 'self-identification' policies for indigenous nations have increasingly become accepted international legal practice since 1977.

The assertion by the authors that Māori or *iwi* and *hapū* are not indigenous is a continuation of what Jackson (2009) refers to as 'the culture of colonisation'. The authors believe that they have the right to determine and define what can be considered an indigenous population and who can be considered to be part of that population.

The highly bizarre notion that Māori are not indigenous because their *wairua* may return back to *Hawaiki* is contested in the works of Walker (2004) and Mead (2003). Walker (2004, 37) notes 'tradition refers to *Hawaiki* as the place of origin for Māori people. The word *Hawaiki* is just a generic term for homeland... the word is used to refer only to the last homeland and not a specific island'. Walker (2004, 38) further contributes that *Hawaiki* could simply be the *Muriwhenua* area for some *hapū* and *iwi* in relation to *Te Rerenga Wairua*. In contrast, Mead (2003, 56) stated 'Many *iwi* believe that [the] *wairua* [of a person] flies to *Te Rerenga Wairua* in the Far North and from there takes an underwater journey to *Hawaiki*, the resting place of peaceful *wairua*'. Therefore, for the *wairua* to begin the journey back to *Hawaiki*, wherever that may be, the *wairua* must be in a state of peace; if not, it will remain [here in Aotearoa New Zealand] (Mead 2003, 56–58). The nature of *wairua* means that not all *wairua* leave Aotearoa New Zealand for *Hawaiki*, and in any case, *Hawaiki* may not refer to a location that is outside of Aotearoa New Zealand.

The arrival date of an indigenous population to a land is irrelevant. This is because the authors are ignorant of *Te Ao Māori*. Some *iwi* traditions believe they were here before the migration, that is, before 1250 AD. Some *whakapapa* traditions are thought to have been present on *Te Ika ā Maui* since creation, for

example, *whakapapa* with connections to the *Rapuwai* (*Ngāi Tahu Whānui*) and the *Patupaiarehe*. Another relevant example is *Tūhoe* and the source of their *whakapapa* being their *maunga*, *Maungapōhatu* and *Hinepūkohurangi*. This demonstrates that there are traditions within *mātauranga* such as *whakapapa* that inform the many different ways there are to be ‘Māori’. This heritage does not follow a standard model of how *wairua* behave after death as the authors would have their readers believe.

Another stance the authors pursue is:

‘The Maoris enjoyed an idyllic life before the arrival of the white man.’

Before the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840, New Zealand was divided among numerous warring tribes. Since 1820, approximately one-third of the Maori population (43,500) had been killed from tribal warfare, and all tribes lived in constant fear of being attacked by a stronger tribe with better weapons. Cannibalism, ritual human sacrifice, slavery, female infanticide, witch-doctory and a lack of any form of law and order were features of their Stone Age existence. [Sic] (Unknown 2015, 10)

First, the statistics supplied by the authors have recently been proven incorrect as Pool (2015, 156) notes:

...suggestions bandied around about numbers at the time of Cook, as high as half a million, or a recent figure [by Tross Publishing pseudo- historian and author, John Robinson] of 127,000, just do not seem to fit with what we know of Māori pre-history, nor projections from first settlement, nor, more importantly, the more robust retro-projections from 1874.

The comments made by the authors about the Māori population is an attempt by the authors to deny that the true source of Māori population loss was the advent of colonisation and settler colonial invasion, and particularly the introduction of European diseases. Pool (2015, 156) notes that ‘introduced pathogens following contact was a major cause of mortality in this period, but the “Musket Wars” certainly added to the death rate’. Therefore, one can conclude that the authors make such claims that population decline is only due to the Musket Wars to enforce ideas of Māori savagery and the martial race theory/myth. The authors distort the true situation about the Māori population and the cause(s) of population decline.

Interestingly, no one I know of has ever described pre-colonial times as ‘idyllic’. This is an interpretation of the authors. Additionally, the authors do not consider the right of indigenous populations (Gibbs 2005; Salomon, Sengupta, and Minority Rights Group 2003; United Nations 1986; *ibid* 2008) to develop. If the authors considered this right, they would recognise that no one in *Te Ao Māori* would be likely to want to go back to a state of pre-colonial living. Modern law, the United Nations Declaration on the Right to Development (United Nations, 1986) and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (United Nations 2008, article 3) state that the development of indigenous populations as collectives is a human right. This means that *Ngāti Awa*, *Tūwharetoa* or *Ngāpuhi* as a group are entitled to develop themselves in a manner that they believe is suitable and beneficial to them, and this right cannot be denied. It must also be noted that development in this context refers also to cultural development (Engle 2010; Gibbs 2005; Xanthaki 2007).

The authors do not understand the idea of living in a *Kaupapa Māori* way as discussed for example by Pihama (2014), Chilisa (2012) and Smith (2015). The vision of *Kaupapa Māori* adherents is to create a modern existence in which there is space to ‘be Māori’. The vision also includes living in a culturally inspired or *tikanga*-based way; ensuring that their children grow up in a culturally rich learning environment; ensuring ways of being for *whānau* that are not a life of socioeconomic struggle or of being ‘*rawa kore*’. This vision is for a collective and involves multiple generations. For my own *whānau*, I add that the vision includes enabling the repair of multiple generations of trauma as a result of colonisation and settler colonialism based on white possession. Given the great lack of understanding that the authors demonstrate in relation to history, *tikanga* and *mātauranga*, I believe that these authors will never be able to understand why living in a *Kaupapa Māori* way would be of importance to Māori.

The authors have chosen to focus on the 2014 Waitangi Tribunal findings which concluded, in the authors’ words, ‘The Maoris did not cede full sovereignty at Waitangi in 1840’ (Unknown 2015, 10). In their thinking:

This lie has recently been put out by the Waitangi Tribunal at the behest of part-Maori radicals. By Article One of the Treaty the chiefs ceded sovereignty of these violent and anarchic islands to Queen Victoria forever – as the speeches of Rewa, Te Kemara, Kawiti and other chiefs of the time show. Twenty years later at the Kohimarama Conference, the largest gathering of chiefs in New Zealand history, they declared full sovereignty, they would have continued their can-

nibalism, which meant a lot to some of them. [Sic] (Unknown 2015, 10)

When expounding this myth, the authors neglect to acknowledge that the Treaty of Waitangi (English version) and *Te Tiriti o Waitangi* (Te Reo Māori version) are two very different documents (Mikaere 2011; Simon 2016) and cannot be read together (Mikaere 2011). The authors also fail to recognise *contra proferentem* relating to common-law doctrine around treaties and contracts. Under this legal concept, the indigenous language, in this case *Te Reo Māori*, is privileged over English, as the indigenous people did not author the document (Blincoe 2016; Simon 2016). The two different versions, one being in English and the other *Te Reo Māori*, clearly make it unreasonable for *mana motuhake* to be ceded because it does not correspond to the *Te Reo Māori* text that states that *kawanatanga* (governance) was given to the Crown. This is acknowledged as being applicable to *Te Tiriti* but has not been implemented by the New Zealand government because of its potential consequences for the white possessive state (Simon 2016, 82; 109–110). Blincoe (2016) highlights the important point that *mana* could not be ceded to the Crown because the *rangatira* did not own it as *mana* did not belong to individuals.

In the circumstances surrounding *Te Tiriti*, the argument rests on whether the British Crown was able to secure sovereignty by a treaty. As demonstrated above, *hapū* and *iwi* ceding sovereignty could not have taken place. Researchers also note that *mana*, and in the case of *Te Tiriti*, *mana motuhake* were ancestrally given to a group (Blincoe 2016; Simon 2016). Even *hapū* and *iwi* that signed *Te Tiriti* have claimed that they did not cede sovereignty (Blincoe 2016; Te Kawariki and Waitangi Network 2012; Simon 2016). The factuality of this lack of cession is supported and accepted by the Waitangi Tribunal (Simon 2016). For Tūwharetoa, Simon (2016) creates a convincing case for non-signatory *hapū* and *iwi*, and how they have maintained *mana mōtuhake*. However, this argument can apply to all *iwi* that did not sign. The discrepancies above further demonstrate that the authors' knowledge of *tikanga* and *Te Ao Māori* is greatly lacking and flawed.

Iwi perspectives and scholars hold that their views on the *Kohimarama* Conference (e.g., Cox 1993, 77–80; Crosby 2015, 9, 73–76, 81, 171, 452; O'Malley 1997, 19–20; Paterson 2011; Walker 2004, 48, 113–116; Ward 2009, 93) confirm a number of points that contradict the statements made by the authors. The above scholars point out that the Conference was created by the then governor, Gore Brown, as a device to divide and conquer the *rangatira*. It is also widely held that only *rangatira* with loyalty towards the Crown were invited to the Conference where the true strategy by Governor Brown was to justify the war with

the *Wiremu Kingi Te Rangitake* in Taranaki. The Conference was premised on the true goal of Governor Brown, to speed up the settlement by Europeans of the native districts and to improve the ‘civilising’ of Māori. As a result of the *hui*, a number of propositions were put forward at the Conference, and by a significant majority, those attending condemned Taranaki *iwi* for the war, and were critical of the *Kingitanga*. It is generally considered that the *rangatira* who participated in the Conference were manipulated by McClean (the Native Secretary) and Governor Brown into affirming their allegiance to the Queen and disassociating themselves from the Māori king and *Wiremu Kingi*, and that they were satisfied with the Conference and as a result should be viewed as a prop for the Governor’s true agenda. In contrast, the authors fail to mention that the speeches of certain chiefs at Waitangi are not representative of *Te Ao Māori*. The speakers’ comments are a reflection only of the *hapū* they represent. Arguably, *Hinana ki Uta, Hinana ki Tai*—the *hui* that confirmed Pōtatau Te Wherowhero as the first Māori king at Pūkawa—could be considered a more important constitutional event and probably had far more *rangatira* attending. Therefore, the authors’ claims made about the *Kohimarama* Conference, as quoted above, are highly questionable.

The authors’ idea that when Aotearoa New Zealand was under the control of Māori, it was ‘violent and anarchic’ is unfounded. First, for anarchy to exist, there would have to be no law and order. As noted by Durie (2012) and Simon (2016), a form of law existed in Aotearoa New Zealand called ‘*tikanga*’. Viewing pre-colonial Aotearoa New Zealand as a violent society through a Eurocentric lens does not consider the requirement under Māori traditional law for everything to be in the form of balance or *taurite*. *Utu* or reciprocity is a fundamental legal, social and cultural concept (Benton, *et al.* 2013), which is a cornerstone of the law that involved seeking revenge when an *iwi* killed an important *iwi* member (Grace 1959, 163–169). *Utu* as a practice meant that everything would be kept in balance.

As a comparison, exploring the modern role of *haka* as belonging in the ‘savage’ domain would be useful in considering Māori and savagery. Hartigan (2011, 39) comments that English writers with no cultural understanding:

position *haka* as vulgar, belonging to the ‘savage’ domain and that it is a practice that should end. Additionally: [c]oncomitant with this is the representation of colonial civilization as progressive, figured against the portrayal of pre-colonial models of time and history as backward. In the case of the *haka*, a neo-colonialist historiography presents Māori culture as that which must give way to the modern.

It does not simply import and re-enact the bloody legacy of colonial histories but activates and enacts that history in the present.

Wright (2010, 58) also refers to a history that promoted white racial superiority:

. . . These period beliefs conflated physical characteristics, based mostly on skin colour, with cultural and historical characteristics, including attributed morality, and then judged on a scale of primitive to sophisticated, with the Europeans and the British – inevitably – at the top.

Therefore, the argument by the authors that Aotearoa New Zealand was anarchic and violent is an unfounded attempt to enact racist propositions and theories while ignoring the system of law that was in place and practiced by *Māori, tikanga*.

I would hold that the war in Taranaki and, in particular, the Waikato are the beginnings of the white possessive government's desire to establish the settler colonial structure we have today. However, the authors comment that:

'In 1863, during the Maori War, Governor Grey 'invaded' the Waikato.' This misrepresentation has been bandied about for several years – usually by so-called 'professional historians' with an axe to grind. The word 'invade' suggests a hostile entry by a foreign power – e.g. Hitler invading Poland in 1983 and Argentina invading the Falkland Islands in 1981. Since Grey was the Governor of New Zealand, holding legal jurisdiction over the whole country, it was not possible for him to 'invade' part of it. What he did was to legally send troops into the Waikato to suppress a rebellion against the sovereign power – something that every state is entitled to do. That is not an 'invasion'. (Unknown 2015, 15)

There are two major problems with the argument the authors put forward by presenting this myth. The first one is their understanding of the term 'invade' and the second is the legitimacy of their claim that 'Māori sovereignty' or *mana motuhake* in Aotearoa New Zealand was ceded.

The *Oxford Dictionary of English* (2010) defines the term 'invade' '(with an object) as (of an armed force) enter (a country or region) so as to subjugate or occupy it; enter (a place, situation, or sphere of activity) in large numbers, especially with intrusive effect; (of a parasite or disease) spread into (an organ-

ism or bodily part).’ Similarly Dictionary.com (2017) defines ‘invade’ as ‘to enter forcefully as an enemy; to go into with hostile intent; to enter like an enemy; to enter as if to take possession; to enter and affect injuriously or destructively; to intrude upon; to encroach or infringe upon and to permeate.’ In the 1860s, armed government forces of the Crown entered Waikato-Tainui, which in those days was an independent country, with hostile intent to subjugate the *iwi*. The colonial government did so in large numbers and as an enemy. It was the intention of the colonial government of the day to take possession of the Waikato region to take the land. The foreign power intruded, encroached and infringed upon the *mana* of the *iwi*. They moved to occupy the land with not only a foreign power but also with a foreign people. If seen from the perspective of the displaced position of the original population, colonisation and/or settler colonialism could be considered to be a form of disease, so then all the definitions provided by the *Oxford Dictionary of English* and Dictionary.com are valid interpretations of ‘invade’. However, it must be noted that the focus on a singular word is a distraction from the true topic of the analysis, which is who was culpable and/or responsible for starting/engaging in warfare on suspicious grounds.

The authors do not acknowledge that an apology was issued by the Crown as part of the Waikato-Tainui Treaty of Waitangi settlement for their provocation in starting the war and the subsequent mass confiscation of *iwi* land. The apology, as part of Waikato-Tainui’s treaty settlement, states that the Crown acted unjustly in sending troops to fight Tainui after unfairly labelling them rebels and offers ‘profound regret and apologises for the loss of lives because of the hostilities arising from its [the Crown’s] invasion and devastation of property and social life that resulted’ (Barber 1995, no pages). Barber’s (1995) observations are important because they diminish and challenge the authors’ claims that the invasion by Governor Grey is a myth. Barber (1995) states that the Crown also acknowledged that the actions of Grey constituted an ‘invasion’ and that the invasion was a breach of *Te Tiriti* and the *mana* of Waikato-Tainui. The argument of the lawfulness of the actions of the Crown rests on whether the British Crown was able to secure sovereignty by a treaty. This was not the case.

The authors are also trying to minimise and/or reject the Māori version of history, and Māori experiences of colonisation, without asking the people of Waikato-Tainui whether they believe the actions of the Crown was an invasion. It is unacceptable that the authors do this by using an unsubstantiated Western legal argument that Māori ceded sovereignty to the Crown. It constitutes bad research practice and, by default, invalidates the argument they are trying to

make. The authors are mistaken about their understandings of the history of the Land Wars and *Te Tiriti* and are distorting history to suit their political aims. They claim that there was a legal rationale for sending troops into the Waikato, that is, to suppress an anti-government rebellion. Grey clearly planned the invasion well in advance, demonstrated by the fact that an invasion of the Waikato was mooted as early as April 1861. Grey justified his invasion on the grounds that the government needed to conduct a punitive expedition against Rewi Maniapoto for his role in the Taranaki War and an unsubstantiated claim by Grey that rebels were planning to attack Auckland (Walker, 2004, 46–47). It is still considered that the Waikato invasion was not only an unjust act but also an act that can be considered illegal and was supported by settler sensationalism (Walker 2004).

Another point of dispute for the authors is that the name of the country Aotearoa is not a *Te Reo* equivalent of New Zealand. On this topic they assert:

Pre-1840 the Maoris did not have a name for the whole of New Zealand as they had no sense of a Maori nation – just tribes. In 1643 the islands became a political entity named New Zealand by the States-General (Parliament) of Holland and this has been its name for 370 years. Aotearoa as a fanciful name for New Zealand began only in 1890 when S. Percy Smith used it as an invented name for the whole country in his fictional story of Kupe. The word ‘Aotearoa’ did not exist. [Sic] (Unknown 2015, 15–16)

It must first be noted that *Kupe* is considered a *tūpuna* to certain *iwi* that participated in this study. Māori collectively believe that *Kupe* is a historical figure, and not someone invented in folklore, as a ‘fictional story’ (Unknown 2015, 16) as suggested by the authors. *Kupe* is, for example, a major theme in the artwork produced to create *Te Herenga Waka* marae at Victoria University of Wellington.

In responding to the broader statement that it is a myth that the Māori name for New Zealand is Aotearoa, the authors are correct to an extent. Māori had no conception of a ‘nation state’, which means that New Zealand as a political grouping of three large islands did not exist for Māori. However, it did exist as individual countries along *iwi* boundary lines. *Mana motuhake* itself was held by *hapū*, and these *hapū* constituted an *iwi*, similar to the idea of a confederated state. Originally, the word ‘tribe’ was used to mean ‘subhuman’ (Jackson 2009). The use of this word continues the authors’ denial of self-definition and their support of the idea of the superior British whiteness and civilisation. Using the word ‘tribe’ is an activation of the Doctrine of Discovery because the authors

convey the attitude that if they do not recognise a system of government as civilised and of a standard recognisable to the racially superior sensibilities of the European, then that system of government should not and did not exist.

The *kaituhi* cannot understand how the use of the name 'Aotearoa' in the Treaty of Waitangi is relevant to this conversation. The transliteration 'Niu Tirenī' was used in *Te Tiriti*. In *Te Reo Māori*, both Aotearoa and *Niu Tirenī* are considered suitable as names for the settler-colonial country/state now known as 'New Zealand' or (as a result of a culture shift over the past 30 years) 'Aotearoa New Zealand'. The use of Aotearoa New Zealand is an indication of modern thinking in Aotearoa New Zealand. That is, there has been a Māori cultural revitalisation and a mainstreaming of *Te Reo Māori* (Sehume 2020); there seems to be societal acceptance on some level of some aspects of *tikanga* and *taha Māori*. This cultural shift leading to 'New Zealand' being termed 'Aotearoa New Zealand' or 'Aotearoa' is problematic for the authors because a name for a country represents a political challenge to the 'took place' theory (Boswell 2015) by which the authors operate. An example of how the 'took place' theory operates is the persistent *Pākehā* belief/myth that New Zealand was settled peacefully. Under this theory, true Māori history is adjusted to forget the acts of colonisation and the place of Māori within the settler colonial paradise created and named 'New Zealand' as a project. This theory represents the possessiveness articulated in Moreton-Robinson's White Possessive Doctrine. (Simon 2016; Moreton-Robinson 2004; *ibid* 2015)

DISCUSSION

If *mana motuhake* exists, like all forms of *mana*, it must be exercised. What is alarming is the existence of attitudes like those of the authors in modern Aotearoa New Zealand society. It is projected that in the future, the Māori economy will grow, and the future direction of New Zealand society will become what I term the 'collective future' (Simon 2016), the future approach to indigenous issues in a whitewashed society like Aotearoa New Zealand. The discussion surrounding our collective future needs to be founded on *tika* and *pono* while discovering a common ground between *hapū* and *iwi* and everyone else. This requires an open and informed mind, a mediated and transparent approach with social betterment, the collective good, social justice, and a *taurite* focus. A rethink on how things are done in society is needed, so it provides *Pākehā* with an opportunity to learn and grow with us as *hapū* and *iwi*.

What needs to be understood is the terrible separation from land, each other, our rights, our power, and we are only engaged with reclaiming this (Jackson

as cited in Simon 2016, 98). On the idea of collective future, the *kaituhi* (Simon 2016, 99) notes that:

the journey forward allows *Pākehā* to learn new ways of doing things, based on indigenous principles. This, in particular, the economic and environmental development, is interconnected with our existence as beings with *whakapapa*, the health of the environment, and the equitable sharing of power based on *mana whenua* and *mana motuhake*. Effectively, three things must change in our collective future: the legal system, the planning system and society overall.

Therefore, the question begs: If society has to change and develop a more equitable and equal standing for all, and the ideas from Veracini's settling theorem are key to that, in the case of Tross Publishing, what must society do?

As part of the legacy of colonisation in Aotearoa New Zealand, there is little political capacity for the displaced indigenous population. In the colonial-based model in operation in Aotearoa New Zealand today, the political capacity of Māori rests with seven allocated 'Māori seats' in Parliament. The allocation of these seats is consistently targeted by non-Māori commentators such as the authors. The call for Māori to experience constitutional transformation as advocated by the independent Māori constitutional review, *Matike Mai Aotearoa* (2016), is a step to move into our collective future. A key part to achieving transformational justice in a collective future is to challenge the lack of historical knowledge about colonisation. Many have noted the great need for national recognition and attention. Meihana (2017, 106) notes that at the turn of the twenty-first century, despite the fact that Māori have been stripped of land and resources and feature negatively in all social and economic indicators, the idea of special privilege remains. Meihana (2017, 106) also notes that 'Maori privilege' in the colonial era had practical application in aiding the moral justification of colonisation. The idea of Māori receiving special privilege in Aotearoa New Zealand society persists because it has political utility. Meihana (2017, 106) states that, 'the notion of 'Māori privilege' is a serious issue because it is about the survival of a worldview that is rooted in the culture of colonisation and the reenforcing of white supremacist permanency on indigenous land.' This means, as noted by Veracini (2014), as part of the process for the settler population to become 'settled', genuine political capacity must be provided to the displaced population. The authors express attitudes that Māori must be grateful for their saviour (colonisation), and that the only possible solution to the problem of political capacity will come from a *Pākehā* epistemological and ontological knowledge that dictates removing special privileges and keeping history in

line with the colonial narrative. This means that as long as this worldview is supported and persists, societal change and Veracini's notions of settling will not or cannot occur.

Ultimately Meihana (2017, 94) notes the following about anti-treatyist attitudes:

[A]nti-Treatyist texts share three common characteristics, the most central of which is that colonisation is deemed to have saved Māori, not only from themselves, but also from a less humane, alternative coloniser [like the French]. Furthermore, the 'rights and privileges of British subjects' imparted to Māori in 1840 were – for a people who had nothing to begin with – a great privilege. Lastly, it is expected that Māori be eternally grateful for what they have received.

Considering this argument, it must be noted that these writings by the authors indicate that the 'settling in' period is coming to a close, and thus the publication of such anti-indigenous, anti-treatyist, anti-scholarship, far-right material must be expected. Writing material for Tross Publishing is an expression of the social anxiety of the privileged.

While I recognise there will be some who view the content of the authors' writings as not worth my time, I believe there is still a significant role we as *Māori* and allied academics need to play, and that is to be 'the critic and conscience of society' (Bridgman 2007; Universities New Zealand 2016). Māori and allied academics must provide a contextual, reality-based, informed alternative to the populist narrative for society and for Māori. It is unfortunate that some *Kaupapa Māori* academics believe that engaging with and criticising the works produced by Tross Publishing is not worth their time. We are in the age of Trumpism, Hobson's Pledge (NZ Herald 2017) and continuing demands to end so-called 'special privilege'. Publication outputs by publishers such as Tross Publishing are increasingly being used to support alt/far-right causes such as Hobson's Pledge or the fight to end the allocating of seats for Māori in local government. Increasingly, the outputs of publishers such as Tross Publishing are becoming a platform for spreading ideals that inform the debasement of the overall conversation. As an academic, I am not perturbed by people with alt/right-wing leanings writing about indigenous issues in Aotearoa New Zealand. The only request I would make is that the debate they create be informed and scholarly. I believe it is healthy to be challenged, but it must be ensured that research is accurate and informed. The authors fail most in the inaccuracy of their information. They need to embrace that the key to social science and humanities scholarship is the ability to innovate with new ideas. They need

to engage with the new material and not take a defensive stance. If the accuracy of information is not ensured, there is the risk of having a Boswell (2015) histographophobic version of New Zealand history that allows authors that publish with Tross Publishing to distort the historical record. The focus of this study on the word 'invasion' and the Kohimarama Conference are employed to control the narrative about colonisation and indigenous rights (and original instructions from our *tupuna*). The unmaking of this history is unwanted because any indigenous or revised version of colonial/neocolonial/settler colonial history is a direct challenge to the authors' 'existing life-world' (Boswell 2015). Something that should be of concern, in terms of these publications, is that Māori input or comment is very absent from publications like *One Treaty, One Nation*. Where Tross Publishing celebrates Māori, it is under the flag of an assimilatory agenda in which these publishers commend only the thoughts of Māori leaders that supported assimilation or the colonial agenda as in the example of Tamati Waka Nene and Tā Apirana Ngata (Robinson 2015).

The problem is that the right to development and a *Kaupapa Māori* being are fundamentally at odds with the authors' worldview in which assimilation, anti-treatyism and anti-scholarship are considered normal. Now, with the recent developments like Hobson's Pledge, social media and President Trump, some would argue their worldview could even be celebrated. With the increasing Pacific Island, Māori, and Asian populations in New Zealand, the declining *Pākehā* birthrate and impending the increasing power of the Māori economy (McNicol 2017; Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment: *Hikina Whakatutuki*, (2015) now and into the future, it can only be concluded that 'Māorification' (as the authors put it) will increase. Therefore, society will change to reflect this. Society must change to reflect the large demographic and future political shift that is expected with the 'so-called' browning of New Zealand. This shift will likely increase the anxieties of people such as the authors, who believe in the assimilatory way, in relation to the changing state of Aotearoa New Zealand. Writing to express a worldview and viewpoint is a way to attempt to control the discussion and concretise their viewpoint on the political, social and cultural landscape of Aotearoa New Zealand. However, their viewpoint serves only to further British hegemony and white possessiveness. The contribution of the authors represents a significantly unhelpful distraction from the much-needed larger conversation about the collective future in Aotearoa New Zealand.

On the topic of the authors' martial race myth/theory, they seek to promote the persistent belief that Māori were always ready for war and hailed from a culture where war-like ancestral attributes informed their conduct. This myth is related to the need for the British to believe in their own racial superiority and their

‘civilised way’ as opposed to the ‘barbaric’, ‘war-mongering’ Māori. This martial race myth/theory is central to the authors’ comments throughout their writing. This myth/theory positions Māori as savages. It must be said that to engage in meaningful conversation with the authors about issues of which they have no cultural understanding is difficult and, due to the need for brevity, this study has not further discussed issues such as cannibalism, female infanticide, slavery and *mahi tohunga* (‘witch-doctory’), which were also raised by the authors. These issues have been addressed adequately and in depth by other authors.

This assertion of these mythical ideas in *One Treaty, One Nation* (Barr *et al.* 2015) represents a distraction from the important conversation that needs to occur in Aotearoa New Zealand and other settler colonial societies. This important conversation must discuss how the society of Aotearoa New Zealand must and can change to become more inclusive and reach a place where a Veracini-style values project, as suggested in the ‘settling on’ stage, can occur. Conversations based on bigotry prevent the settler population of Aotearoa New Zealand from settling and the indigenous population of Aotearoa New Zealand from achieving *mana motuhake* in a post-settler colonial post-treaty society. If Aotearoa New Zealand society continues to have uninformed conversations based on racist attitudes, the bigotry and whiteness will continue to impede the potential for a harmonious future in which the attitudes that support white privilege and settler colonialism displayed by the authors will no longer exist. To prevent such uninformed conversations, the Aotearoa New Zealand population as a whole must become more educated on issues of importance to Māori. While the authors’ work may represent alt/far-right, anti-treatyist and anti-scholarship thinking, it also reflects a proportion of the population’s thinking, and unfortunately, is simply anti-indigenous. It seeks to deny Māori an identity and indigeneity to Aotearoa New Zealand in a form of settler colonial erasure. This study identifies three intertwining strands of great importance to Māori being able to participate in the collective future of Aotearoa New Zealand: the right to development, the right to a Kaupapa Māori existence, the *ritenga* to exercise *mana motuhake*. The use of the term ‘*ritenga*’ to mean ‘practice with the implied notion of the normal way of doing things’ instead of using the word ‘right’ is deliberate. This removes the connotation that being able to exercise *mana motuhake* is something that is provided by the state to denote something that is essential to the indigenous population. This avoids the phenomenon that allows the state to appear benevolent while removing the moral position from the indigenous population. It is contended here that the term *ritenga* replace the term rights when dealing with indigenous peoples in Aotearoa New Zealand and elsewhere. A right is a provision by the settler state as indigenous peoples we prefer it to be the normal way of doing things. If

Māori are to fully participate in the collective future of Aotearoa New Zealand, and if *mana motuhake* is to become a cornerstone of that collective future, political social licence will need to be acquired by the indigenous population.

CONCLUSION

The *kaituhi* recognises that further research on this topic is required, and this study creates opportunities for that to occur. It is clear from the analysis that the ideas expressed in *One Treaty, One Nation* (Barr *et al.* 2015) represent alt/far-right, anti-treatyist and anti-scholarship thinking. However, such publications should be taken as a signal that the shifting social, economic, and demographic change is affecting the *Pākehā* population, and that Māori have arrived at the twilight of the 'settling in' period. This has led to publications by Tross Publishing that reflect the anxieties felt by the authors and others with similar attitudes. Ultimately, 'New Zealanders' have an inevitable collective future together. The three intertwining strands of the right to development, the right to a *Kaupapa* Māori existence, the *ritenga* to exercise *mana motuhake*, are of great importance to the collective future of Aotearoa New Zealand.

Bigotry and racism are the greatest barriers to the people of Aotearoa New Zealand achieving a harmonious collective future that is beneficial to all people of this country. The only way to combat the attitudes that hinder the path to a harmonious collective future is to ensure that the population of Aotearoa New Zealand is well educated on Māori and colonial historical and current issues. In the preface of *One Treaty, One Nation* (Barr *et al.* 2015), the authors use the term 'myth' to describe what researchers have stated on topics relevant to Māori history and present. However, the only myths being propagated are those presented in the writings of the authors. If such attitudes continue to be propounded and shared by many people, genuine political capacity will never be granted to the displaced indigenous population of Aotearoa New Zealand. Sadly, this means the wellbeing that is desired by being allowed to be human will not transpire. Thus, *mana motuhake* in a post-settlement, post-settler colonial society will never be achieved, which jeopardises the collective future. The authors do not factor in ethics, particularly development ethics, into their writings and their straw man arguments.

The remedy to this is the teaching of history in our schools. It is heartening to learn of the recent government's move to do this but the question needs to be asked – which and whose reality will be taught? And what values should society in Aotearoa New Zealand be based upon?

GLOSSARY

- Haka* Performance of the haka, posture dance – vigorous dances with actions and rhythmically shouted words. A general term for several types of such dances.
- Hapū* Kinship group, clan – section of a large kinship group and the primary political unit in traditional Māori society. It consisted of a number of *whānau* sharing descent from a common ancestor, usually being named after the ancestor, but sometimes from an important event in the group's history. A number of related *hapū* usually shared adjacent territories forming a looser indigenous nation federation (*iwi*).
- Hawaiki* Ancient homeland – the places from which Māori migrated to Aotearoa/New Zealand. According to some traditions, it was Io, the supreme being, who created Hawaiki-nui, *Hawaiki-roa*, *Hawaiki-pāmamao* and *Hawaiki-tapu*, places inhabited by *atua*. It is believed that the *wairua* returns to these places after death, and speeches at *tangihanga* refer to these as the final resting place of *wairua*.
- Hinana ki Uta*,
Hinana ki Tai The name of a great multi-tribal meeting held at Pūkawa, in 1856. On that occasion Iwikau Te Heuheu, the *ariki* of *Tūwharetoa*, proposed Pōtatau Te Wherowhero as the first Māori king.
- Iwi* Extended kinship group, nation, people
- Kaupapa Māori* Māori approach, Māori topic, Māori customary practice, Māori institution, Māori agenda, Māori principles, Māori ideology – a philosophical doctrine, incorporating the knowledge, skills, attitudes and values of Māori society.
- Kawanatanga* Governance. In relation to *Te Tiriti o Waitangi* the official version this word means governance.
- Kīngitanga* King Movement – a movement which developed in the 1850s, culminating in the anointing of Pōtatau Te Wherowhero as King. Established to stop the loss of land to the colonists, to maintain law and order, and to promote traditional values and culture. Strongest support comes from the *Tainui iwi*. Current leader is Tūheitia Paki.
- Mana* Prestige, authority, control, power, influence, status, spiritual power, charisma – mana is a supernatural force in a person, place or object.

<i>Mana Motuhake</i>	Indigenous sovereignty; a tikanga concept where the <i>iwi</i> or <i>hapū</i> have the authority and capacity to be autonomous, self-governing entities. There is a difference with <i>mana whenua</i> , which literally means power, authority, jurisdiction, influence, or governance over land or territory.
<i>Mana Whenua</i>	Territorial rights, power from the land, authority over land or territory, jurisdiction over land or territory – power associated with possession and occupation of <i>iwi</i> land.
<i>Maunga</i>	Mountain
<i>Mātauranga</i>	Traditional knowledge
<i>Muriwhenua</i>	North Cape area of the North Island, Far North (i.e. north of Kaitiāia).
<i>Pākehā</i>	A term usually used to refer to a person of European ancestry.
<i>Patupaiarehe</i>	Fairy folk – fair-skinned mythical people who live in the bush on mountains. Although like humans in appearance, the belief is that they do not eat cooked food and are afraid of fires.
<i>Rangatira</i>	Leader
<i>Rawa kore</i>	Poverty
<i>Ritenga</i>	Custom, customary practice, habit, practice, resemblance, implication – the normal way of doing things according to tikanga or the directions of tūpuna.
<i>Tā</i>	Sir
<i>Taha Māori</i>	Māori identity, Māori character, Māori side, Māori heritage, Māori ancestry, Māori descent.
<i>Tauīwi</i>	Foreigner, European, non-Māori, colonist.
<i>Taurite</i>	To be or keep in balance. A fundamental tikanga concept based on utu.
<i>Te Ao Māori</i>	Māori world
<i>Te Reo Māori</i>	Māori language
<i>Te Rerenga</i>	Cape Rēinga, Leaping Place of Spirits.
<i>Wairua</i>	
<i>Te Tiriti (o Waitangi)</i>	The Māori language version of The Treaty of Waitangi
<i>Tikanga</i>	Correct procedure, custom, habit, lore, method, manner, rule, way, code, meaning, plan, practice, convention, protocol – the customary system of values and practices that have developed over time and are deeply embedded in the social context. A system of law.
<i>Tūmātauenga</i>	God/deity of war and mankind
<i>Tūpuna</i>	Ancestor

<i>Utu</i>	Revenge, vengeance, retaliation, payback, retribution, cost, price, wage, fee, payment, salary, reciprocity an important concept concerned with the maintenance of balance and harmony in relationships between individuals and groups and order within Māori society, whether through gift exchange or as a result of hostilities between groups.
<i>Wairua</i>	Spirit, soul – spirit of a person which exists beyond death. It is the non-physical spirit, distinct from the body and the mauri. To some, the <i>wairua</i> resides in the heart or mind of someone while others believe it is part of the whole person and is not located at any particular part of the body.
<i>Whakapapa</i>	Lineage, descent – reciting <i>whakapapa</i> was, and is, an important skill and reflected the importance of genealogies in Māori society in terms of leadership, land and fishing rights, kinship and status. It is central to all Māori institutions.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

A previous version of this paper was presented at the 2016 Māori Association of Social Sciences Conference at Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington. The author would like to thank all those that contributed to the development of this article. In particular, for the great advice from the anonymous peer reviewers. This article is written in loving memory of Kathy Woods (1948–2020).

Moe mai rā e te whaea, okioki atu

NOTES

- 1 Independent Scholar

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