Bracketing [Belief], or: The Locus and Status of ‘Belief’ in Cultural Analysis

Abstract

This introductory article rehearses some of the difficulties that anthropologists, among others, have with the notion of “belief”, especially when referring to cultural “others”. The essay calls for a renewal of reflexivity and discretion in anthropological description and analysis. While accepting arguments that “belief” refers to unexamined premises underlying thought systems, the article suggests a more nuanced approach to statements and interpretations of “belief”. For one, the tendency to blur the distinctions between belief and knowledge should not be simply taken for granted. Secondly, questions of intentionality and agency with respect to belief should be rethought. Thirdly, we require an epistemological dialogue with other understandings and conceptualisations of the domain(s) in question. Finally, it is necessary to recognise the several historical layers inscribed into the term, existing simultaneously. All these tendencies conspire towards a reflexive realignment of the notion of “belief”.